THE LONG VIEW

Bottom Line Up Front: The erosion of reliable U.S. security commitments to Taiwan—driven by political volatility, military overextension, and transactional foreign policy—poses a high-probability threat to regional stability, prompting Taipei to accelerate asymmetric defense capabilities and deepen defense-industrial ties with Europe, creating both strategic opportunities and escalation risks for the EU. Threat Identification: The primary threat is the weakening credibility of U.S. security assurances to Taiwan, exemplified by President Trump’s characterization of arms sales as 'negotiating chips' and the pause on a $14 billion arms package due to munitions shortages from Operation Epic Fury [SWP, 2026]. This creates a strategic vacuum that China may exploit, while forcing Taiwan to diversify its defense partnerships beyond the U.S. [SWP, 2026]. Concurrently, Europe’s nascent defense cooperation with Taiwan risks Chinese economic retaliation but is framed as essential for technological resilience and global trade security. Probability Assessment: High likelihood within 12–24 months. U.S. munitions stockpiles remain critically depleted, with Tomahawk missile deliveries to Japan already delayed by up to two years, signaling sustained supply constraints [Financial Times, cited in SWP, 2026]. Internal U.S. political divisions—between Rubio’s hawkish stance and Vance’s isolationism—suggest continued policy unpredictability [SWP, 2026]. Europe-Taiwan defense collaboration is already underway, with German firms attending Taiwan’s defense exhibitions and UAV cooperation emerging with Poland and Ukraine, indicating momentum [SWP, 2026]. Impact Analysis: A collapse in U.S. arms delivery reliability could undermine Taiwan’s 'porcupine strategy' of asymmetric deterrence, particularly delaying HIMARS and drone deployments critical for amphibious invasion deterrence [SWP, 2026]. For Europe, deeper ties enhance defense innovation and supply chain resilience but expose firms like Hensoldt to Chinese export bans on dual-use items, as seen in April 2026 [SWP, 2026]. A Taiwan crisis would disrupt global semiconductor supply, directly threatening European economic security, making indirect engagement a core interest. Recommended Actions: 1. Taiwan should accelerate domestic production of loitering drones and mobile missile systems, leveraging EU testing and certification support (e.g., DEKRA) to reduce U.S. dependency. 2. European states should coordinate defense-industrial cooperation through the European Defence Agency, focusing on dual-use technologies (drones, AI, secure comms) while maintaining formal adherence to the One China policy. 3. The U.S. should clarify its Taiwan policy to counter strategic ambiguity with credible, stockpile-backed commitments, especially for approved $11 billion arms package delivery timelines. 4. EU and Taiwan should co-develop China-free drone supply chains, expanding on current export growth (136,010 units to Europe in Q1 2026) to build mutual resilience [SWP, 2026]. Confidence Matrix: - U.S. policy erosion: High confidence — based on public statements, paused arms sales, and intra-administration conflict. - Taiwan’s strategic pivot: High confidence — confirmed by procurement shifts, budget allocations, and international partnerships. - European escalation risk: Medium-high confidence — evidenced by Chinese export bans, but escalation likely calibrated rather than immediate. - Effectiveness of porcupine strategy: Medium confidence — based on Ukraine analogies, but untested against PLA-scale invasion. - Sustainability of U.S. stockpiles: High confidence — supported by Pentagon ‘command of the reload’ warnings and combat expenditure data [SWP, 2026].